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Confirming The Constitutional Right of 
Meaningful Access to the Courts in Non-Criminal 
Cases in Washington State 
James A. Bamberger1 
[T]he right to access to the courts is fundamental to our system of justice. 
Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights”. . . . [M]eaningful 
access requires representation. Where rights and responsibilities are 
adjudicated in the absence of representation, the results are often unjust. If 
representation is absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is 
justice, and for the same reason.2  
I.  JUSTICE IS WANTING 
Carol is a single mom who earns her living as a teacher’s aide.  She has a 
twelve-year-old daughter, Elsie, who has Down Syndrome.  Carol’s 
neighbors have been complaining about Elsie, saying that she “acts out” and 
is disruptive of other tenants in the apartment complex.  After receiving a 
number of complaints about Elsie, Carol’s landlord advises her that she and 
Elsie will have to move.  When Carol explaines that they have nowhere else 
to go and that much of Elsie’s conduct is due to her developmental 
disability, her landlord tells her that he has no choice but to take legal steps 
to evict her.  Apologizing, he hands her a summons and complaint for 
unlawful detainer.  The court papers say that Carol is to appear before the 
Superior Court in a week and prove why she should not be evicted.   
If Carol and Elsie are evicted, they will be homeless.  Frightened, she 
calls the CLEAR legal hotline and asks for an attorney.3  She is told that the 
legal aid program that serves her community is overwhelmed and has closed 
intake.  She is referred to her local pro bono program.  Upon contacting that 
program, she is told that they, too, are overwhelmed, and no pro bono 
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attorney is available to take her case.  She will have to defend the eviction 
alone.   
Carol shows up at the courthouse on the date and time of the hearing.   
Presiding Judge A. Fair Law calls her case.  The landlord’s attorney submits 
numerous declarations from tenants documenting the allegedly disruptive 
nature of Elsie’s conduct.  No witnesses are called.  Carol pleads with Judge 
Law, telling him she has no place to move and that the claims regarding 
Elsie’s conduct are blown out of proportion.  She tells him that she tried to 
get a lawyer to help her, but was unsuccessful.  She asks Judge Law to 
appoint an attorney to help her defend  and preserve her housing.  Judge 
Law says that he cannot appoint a lawyer for her, because she has not been 
charged with a crime.  He then asks whether she has any witnesses or other 
evidence to offer.  She says she has none.  Apologizing, the judge tells 
Carol that he has no choice but to issue an order granting the landlord’s 
request for a writ of restitution, and that she will have to be out of the 
apartment within ten days.  Looking down while signing the order, Judge 
Law calls the next case. 
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich 
and poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional 
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the 
courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all 
parts of the country to millions of persons. . . . There is something 
tragic in the fact that a plan and method of administering justice, 
honestly designed to make efficient and certain that litigation on 
which at last all rights depend, should result in rearing insuperable 
obstacles in the path of those who most need protection, so that 
litigation becomes impossible, rights are lost and wrongs go 
unredressed.4   
 A week ago, Thomás flew into a rage and beat his wife, Anna, in front of 
their two young children.  It was not the first time that Thomás had done 
this; he has been abusing Anna for years.  But things were different this 
time.  The abuse frightened nine-year-old Luís so badly, that he ran into the 
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back room and called 911.  The police arrived, subdued Thomás, and took 
him away.  Anna was taken by ambulance to the hospital where she was 
treated for a multiple injuries.   
Thomás was arraigned on charges of second degree assault.  Indigent and 
unable to pay for an attorney, he was appointed a public defender to 
represent him.  A no-contact order was entered in accordance with the 
Revised Code of Washington 10.99.040, and Thomás was released pending 
trial. 
Resolved to break free from the abusive relationship and protect her 
children, Anna decided to seek a divorce from Thomás.  She talked to an 
attorney who required a $5,000 retainer.  Not having any money, she sought 
help from her local pro bono program.  The issues of domestic violence 
added complexity to the case. It was also likely that Thomás would contest 
Anna’s request the children be placed primarily with her, because she 
would ask the court to restrict his contact with them.  No local attorney was 
willing or able to take her case on a pro bono basis.  She was encouraged to 
talk with the local courthouse facilitator, who could show her the forms 
necessary to file the case on her own.  Frustrated, Anna cried out, “he beats 
me and he gets a lawyer.  I get beaten and need protection and I get nothing.  
Where is justice?!” 
The law permits every [person] to try [her] own case, but ‘the lay 
vision of every man his own lawyer has been shown by all 
experience to be an illusion.’  It is a virtual impossibility for a 
[person] to conduct even the simplest sort of a case under the 
existing rules of procedure, and this fact robs the in forma pauperis 
proceeding of much of its value to the poor unless supplemented 
by the providing of counsel. . . . We can end the existing denial of 
justice to the poor if we can secure an administration of justice 
which shall be accessible to every person no matter how humble, 
and which shall be adjusted so carefully to the needs of the present 
day world that it cannot be dislocated, or the evenness of its 
operation be disturbed, by the fact of poverty.5 
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 Carol and Anna are among the thousands of Washington state residents 
who need the protection of the civil court system.  They do not have a 
chance to realize justice in a matter that is of the utmost importance to them 
and their families because they are poor and unable to obtain attorney 
assistance.  Carol and Anna are powerless to assert and enforce their legal 
rights without legal representation.  The court system cannot deliver justice 
in their cases because justice is grounded in legal formality and constructed 
on procedural and substantive legal frameworks that presume the 
availability of attorney representation.  For Carol and Anna, the civil court 
system is functionally inaccessible and irrelevant.  In its worst 
characterization, it is an instrument of institutionalized oppression.   
Nearly a century ago, a young Chicago attorney named Reginald Heber 
Smith chronicled the failures of our system of administering justice in his 
treatise, Justice and the Poor.6  With amazing clarity and clairvoyance, 
Smith documented deep and systemic failures of the justice system, and 
predicted that the system would become increasingly irrelevant and 
unresponsive to the needs of the poor unless direct action was invoked.   
Central to Smith’s indictment of the American justice system was its 
failure to provide adequate and effective legal representation to the millions 
of poor people who cannot afford counsel to assert, enforce, and defend 
important personal rights.  He explained that: 
[T]he substantive law, however fair and equitable itself, is 
impotent to provide the necessary safeguards unless the 
administration of justice, which alone gives effect and force to 
substantive law, is in the highest sense impartial.  It must be 
possible for the humblest to invoke the protection of the law, 
through proper proceedings in the courts, for any invasion of rights 
by whomsoever attempted, or freedom and equality vanish into 
nothingness.7   
Given the unique nature of the law and complexity of judicial 
proceedings, Smith asserted that a comprehensive system was needed to 
ensure representation for those whose rights were the subject of 
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adjudication and who, because of their poverty, could not secure essential 
legal assistance.   
In the years since, the crisis painstakingly documented by Smith has 
deepened.8  Poor litigants like Carol and Anna, who  face  the prospect of 
extraordinary personal loss (housing for Carol, and personal and family 
safety and security for Anna) cannot meaningfully defend or enforce their 
substantive legal rights in the courts of this state.  They stand helpless, as 
the machinery of justice grinds them down to nothing.  It is profoundly 
ironic that, on the one hand, a poor person facing the prospect of spending 
but a single night secure in the county jail is entitled to the assistance of 
counsel at public expense while, on the other hand, those faced with the 
imminent loss of housing through eviction or foreclosure and the 
consequent insecurity of homelessness, those who must contend with 
immediate threats to their personal and family safety, or those who cannot 
meet the basic needs of their families because they have been denied 
essential governmental subsistence benefits are left to navigate the court 
system on their own.   
Both nationally and in Washington State, judges preside over a system 
that continues to lose face with the public in large measure because it 
systematically denies meaningful access to those who need its protection 
the most—the poor, the vulnerable, the victimized, and the socially or 
culturally disenfranchised.  Efforts to assert a right to counsel as an incident 
to constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection have been 
rebuffed,9 and the poor are left to rely on a grossly under-funded network of 
legal aid programs, pro bono programs, and an ever expanding array of self-
help pamphlets and web-sites. 
The failures of the system Smith painstakingly documented persist.  The 
result is a continuing erosion of the citizenry’s perception of the integrity of 
our court system and its capacity to disseminate fair and impartial justice.10  
If democracy is to remain relevant, the judicial system must be restored to a 
position of respect.  This can only be achieved if those who need the 
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protection of that system can secure timely and meaningful access—and to 
do this, they will need legal counsel. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the potential sources of a state 
constitutional right of meaningful access to the civil court system in 
Washington State,11 to explore the degree (if any) to which such a right 
manifests itself in the requirement that counsel be appointed at public 
expense in certain non-criminal cases, and, to the extent that such a 
requirement exists, offer an analytical framework to help judges determine 
when and under what circumstances appointment of counsel is 
constitutionally mandated.   
This article concludes that, under Washington’s constitution, individuals 
have a fundamental right of access to the courts, that the judicial branch has 
a corresponding constitutional obligation to facilitate that right, and that the 
intersection of this right and duty must manifest itself in a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of a right to counsel at public expense in non-criminal 
cases. 
The analysis and theories developed in this article are grounded in state 
constitutional law.  They do not flow from traditional federal constitutional 
due process considerations,12 nor are they grounded in considerations or 
jurisprudence relevant to determining when, and under what circumstances 
indigent criminal defendants are entitled to appointed counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the parallel 
Washington State Constitutional provision, Article I, Sec. 22.  In contrast to 
such analyses, this discussion of the right to counsel in non-criminal cases 
expounds on ideas of an access-based right which have been the subject of 
increasing conversation within the state and national equal justice 
communities.13   
The balance of this article will more fully explore the crisis in civil access 
to justice.  It also explores historical antecedents of the individual’s right of 
access to the courts within the context of our constitutional and natural 
rights legal traditions, and the state’s corresponding duty to facilitate that 
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right.  The article reviews Washington State’s constitutional framework and 
jurisprudential history relating to these considerations, finding a somewhat 
scattered and substantially undeveloped analytical framework for 
considering when and how the right of access should be facilitated.  The 
article proposes a more logical framework for both the enforcement and 
practical administration of this right within the context of both the open 
courts and within the privileges and immunities provisions of the 
Washington Constitution.  Finally, the article explores the substantial 
parallels between the right of meaningful access to the courts within the 
Washington State constitutional context and within emerging international 
jurisprudential norms and requirements.  
II. THE PROBLEM:  WASHINGTON STATE’S COURT SYSTEM IS 
FUNCTIONALLY INACCESSIBLE TO LOW-INCOME PEOPLE WITH 
CIVIL LEGAL PROBLEMS 
Washington establishes and maintains courts to administer justice and 
provide a forum for the assertion, protection, and defense of constitutional, 
statutory, contractual, and common law rights and responsibilities.14  As 
designed, courts serve as truth-finding, conflict resolution forums.  In the 
tradition of the Anglo-American experience, courts are designed to achieve 
resolution of conflicts through competition of opposing factual and legal 
arguments.   
Given the court’s purpose, design, and operation, certain core 
competencies are central to any litigant’s ability to effectively assert or 
defend important legal rights and claims in the Washington State trial and 
appellate court system.  These include 
• knowledge and understanding of the relevant law (constitutional, 
statutory, regulatory, case, and common law—including applicable 
precedent relevant to the matters that are implicated in the particular 
legal proceeding);   
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• knowledge and understanding of the jurisdiction and rules of practice 
and procedure in the court in which the proceeding is pending; 
• capacity to develop and effectively present evidence to the court, 
both in support of the individual’s position and to rebut or negate 
evidence offered by the opposing party; 
• some understanding of legal reasoning and the process of making a 
legal argument; and 
• ability to provide informed and objective judgment in service of the 
client’s objectives. 
 Lawyers have been trained in these competencies.  Lay people have not.  
So central are these competencies to the capacity of the courts to perform 
their proper functions that persons untrained in these competencies may not 
appear before the courts except in a self-representational or pro se 
capacity.15   
This is not surprising. The law involves a special language with many 
dialects that must be mastered in order for one to be in a position to 
effectively navigate the judicial system.  Legal proceedings are foreign and 
confusing to lay people who are untrained in the law and legal practice.  It 
follows that those who are untrained in the substance and language of the 
law and legal practice cannot reasonably expect to successfully assert, 
enforce, or defend their legal rights in the courts of this state.16  This truth 
echoes in Washington Supreme Court Justice Richard Sanders’ observation 
that “legal representation [is such] a practical necessity that those 
knowledgeable in the law would have to admit that the man who represents 
himself has a fool for a client.”17   
The Civil Legal Needs Study recently published by the Washington 
Supreme Court’s Task Force of Civil Equal Justice Funding confirms that 
legal representation is the key to achieving effective outcomes to civil legal 
problems.18  The study found that while nearly two-thirds of low-income 
respondents who were able to secure legal assistance were satisfied with the 
justice experience and the resulting outcome of their legal problems 
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(regardless of whether they substantively achieved what they had hoped to 
at the outset of their case), 75 percent of those without legal representation 
experienced outcomes that were inconsistent with their expectations.19  
The Civil Legal Needs Study documents the depth of the gap between the 
numbers of low-income people needing legal assistance in connection with 
a civil legal problem and those who are able to secure that assistance.  
Every year more than 80 percent of all low-income households experience 
at least one civil legal problem for which legal assistance is indicated.20  Of 
these households, nearly nine out of ten face the problem without legal help 
of any kind.21  Statistical and anecdotal information confirms that a growing 
number of civil litigants are unrepresented by legal counsel on matters that 
implicate many of the most personal rights and interests—personal and 
family safety, dissolution, child residential placement, child support, 
eviction defense, defense against housing foreclosures, protection against 
abusive consumer practices, and predatory lending schemes, just to name a 
few.   
The Civil Legal Needs Study also confirms that many low-income people 
who have claims that should be brought to the judicial system cannot do so 
because they are unable to secure legal assistance.22  Examples include 
housing and employment discrimination problems, problems arising from 
the administration of governmental, educational, municipal services and 
benefits, and problems involving the rights of disabled people to appropriate 
accommodations.23   
The chronic inability to obtain legal representation on matters that 
present themselves in the courts of this state (or, if counsel were available, 
would likely be presented) effectively denies justice to thousands of low-
income residents in Washington every year.  Conversely, it converts the 
court system of this state—an enterprise established and maintained by the 
state for the purpose of ensuring the fair and impartial administration of 
justice—into a captive enterprise that enables those who, through no special 
merit other than they can afford to retain necessary legal assistance, are able 
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to secure a decided advantage in the presentation of their claims and 
defenses against the unschooled and unrepresented lay litigant. 
III.  ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM:  A FUNDAMENTAL AND 
ENFORCEABLE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
Modern Anglo-American legal systems are grounded in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century concepts of natural law and individual rights theory.   In 
essence, these theories start from the presumption that all individuals are 
blessed with full rights and liberties, and that they are free to exercise and 
enjoy them as they please.  Free individuals may elect to live in a 
community in order to gain certain advantages not otherwise available to 
them.  In the course of organizing the communities within which they live, 
and to establish general norms of conduct applicable to all, such individuals 
will cede a portion of their natural rights and liberties to the community 
itself.  On this point, the English legal commentator William Blackstone 
noted:  
[Natural law sums up these rights in the appellation] “natural 
liberty of mankind.”  This natural liberty consists properly in the 
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, 
unless by the law of nature. . . . But every man, when he enters into 
society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so 
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the 
advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to 
those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish.24 
Natural law theory recognizes three categories of “absolute rights”:  the 
rights to (1) personal security, (2) personal liberty, and (3) private 
property.25  These rights have been recognized as either being natural in 
origin, intrinsic to the individual, or granted by society in exchange for the 
rights and benefits of society itself—including the right to protection of 
such rights.  In one characterization or another, these core or absolute rights 
have been articulated and rearticulated in every statement of individual 
rights and freedoms from the Magna Carta to the Declaration of 
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Independence, to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and to 
more recent statements of the inherent rights of individuals.26  In the Anglo-
American experience, protection of these absolute rights has served as the 
expressed raison d’etre of constitutional government.  Blackstone explained 
it this way: “[T]he first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and 
regulate [the] absolute rights of individuals . . . the principal view of human 
laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as 
are absolute . . . ”27   
The Washington State Constitution is grounded in  a natural law 
approach to the relationship between the individual and government.  
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 1, declares that “All political power 
is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain 
individual rights.”28 
While natural law theory recognized three areas of “absolute rights,” the 
maintenance and protection of which is the “first and primary end of human 
laws,” it was also understood that such rights are meaningless if there is no 
means for their enforcement.  Consequently, the Anglo-American tradition 
recognized a class of subordinate rights, the primary purpose of which is to 
enable the individual to protect and enforce his or her primary or absolute 
rights.  Among these subordinate rights is the right to seek and secure relief 
in the courts.  As Blackstone explained in his Commentaries:  
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying 
to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in 
England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and 
property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, 
and the law be duly administered therein. The emphatical words of 
Magna Carta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment 
of law (says sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them 
in all his courts, are these; “nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut 
differemus rectum vel justitiam: [To no man will we sell, or deny, 
or delay, right or justice] and therefore every subject,” continues 
the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, 
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vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal 
without any exception, may take his remedy by the course of the 
law, and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely 
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without 
delay.”29 
This right of access is fundamental and has been affirmed and reaffirmed 
throughout the course of the nation’s and Washington State’s history.  Chief 
Justice John Marshall observed in the landmark case of Marbury v. 
Madison that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that 
protection.”30  A century later, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he right 
to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.  In an organized 
society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the 
foundation of orderly government.  It is one of the highest and most 
essential privileges of citizenship.”31  Alternatively, Reginald Heber Smith 
characterized it as follows:  
Not only was the right to freedom and equality of justice set apart 
with those other cardinal rights of liberty and of conscience which 
were deemed sacred and inalienable, but it was made most 
important of all because on it all the other rights, even the rights to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, were made to depend.  In 
a word, it became the cornerstone of the Republic.32 
 These pronouncements demonstrate that the American tradition 
carries forward both the substance and rationale of the natural right of 
access to the courts described by Blackstone.33  While the Anglo-
American legal tradition clearly recognizes a fundamental individual 
right of access to the courts, the following subordinate questions arise. 
A. What is the Scope of the Right? 
In its simplest characterization, it is a right of access to the courts 
established by the people through their government for the fair and proper 
administration of justice.  In Washington State constitutional parlance, it 
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means that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly and without 
unnecessary delay.”34  This language descends directly from Blackstone.  It 
plainly means that the justice available to citizens through the courts of the 
state must be administered openly and that it must be equally available to 
all.   
The essential purpose of judicial administration is to ensure the “fair and 
proper administration of justice.”35  In the context of court proceedings, this 
purpose is discharged by ensuring that justice is done in those cases and 
controversies that are presented to the court.  It follows, a fortiori, that 
access for the sake of access, without the corresponding ability to 
meaningfully participate in the system to the end that justice is capable of 
being done is the antithesis of the constitutional promise and its underlying 
historical rationale.   
For example, no one would argue that there would be access to the courts 
in the sense contemplated by the Anglo-American tradition were the 
courthouse doors physically open to all, but the law itself (i.e., the statutes, 
cases, court rules, etc.) is made available only to those who could pay a fee 
or those who owned property in the jurisdiction.36  All would agree that 
institutionalizing a system that limits access to applicable law and 
procedure to a select few would effectively preclude everyone else’s ability 
to use the court for the purpose for which it has been established—to assert, 
enforce, and defend important rights.37  Thus, it is manifest that access (i.e., 
the ability to walk into the courthouse) simply for the sake of access cannot 
be the standard.   
Our court system is the central mechanism for the orderly 
resolution of disputes that arise between citizens and between 
citizens and the government.  Moreover, it is manifest that there is 
a direct relation between access to the courts and the exertion of 
power within the system relative to the evaluation and resolution of 
citizens’ grievances.  Failure to provide equal access to the courts . 
. . is fraught with the dangers of alienating our citizenry from the 
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system and encouraging self-help with concomitant breaches of the 
peace and likely overtones of violence.38 
To vindicate the essential purpose of the right of access to the courts, the 
constitutional standard must be a right of “meaningful access.”39  
“Meaningful access” can be defined as the capacity to appear and 
effectively participate in proceedings properly presented to the court in a 
manner that will allow the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the 
end that justice can be done.40       
B. Where is the Right of Meaningful Access Recognized Within the 
Washington State Constitution?   
 There are two sources of a right of meaningful access to the courts in 
non-criminal cases in Washington State’s Constitution.  The first is 
expressed, the second is implied.  Like more than forty other states,41 
Washington’s Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 includes a provision directing 
that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without 
unnecessary delay.”42  Simple and elegant, this provision incorporates the 
natural law rights of access understood to be necessary to the fair and 
proper ordering of society and the resolution of disputes involving the rights 
of citizens and their relations with the government.43  It confirms and 
renders enforceable the fundamental right of “meaningful access” to the 
courts in cases where significant interests are implicated and where the 
court is the forum within which such rights are adjudicated.44   
In addition to the expressed right of access to the courts set out in 
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec.10, the right of all citizens to have 
equal access to the machinery of justice, such that the courts of the state 
may fairly perform the constitutional function, is implied in the privileges 
and immunities clause of the state constitution, Washington Constitution 
Article I, Sec. 22.  This section prohibits the state from maintaining a civil 
court system that grants a decided advantage to, and unmerited privilege of 
access in favor, of those who can afford to secure the assistance of persons 
Meaningful Access to the Courts 397 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
with the professional competencies necessary to enable to them to 
meaningfully assert and defend their legal interests within the judicial 
tribunal at the expense of those who cannot.  This source of the right and its 
practical implications are discussed more fully below in section V. 
C. What is the Rationale and Constitutional Significance of this Right?   
 The right of meaningful access serves two distinct but complementary 
constitutional objectives.  First, it enables the citizenry to effectively assert, 
enforce, and defend personal rights, liberties, and prerogatives.  In so doing, 
it operates to implement the natural law contract between the citizenry and 
the state.45  Second, and equally important, the right ensures the proper 
functioning of the judicial branch to the end that it is capable of fairly and 
impartially resolving disputes46 between citizens and between citizens and 
their government,47 such that “justice is done in the cases that come before 
the court.”48  From this perspective, the right of “meaningful access” 
ensures that the judicial branch is perceived to be legitimate in the eyes of 
the public (as opposed to being perceived as the captive forum operated for 
the exclusive benefit of those with means to secure legal representation). 
At common law, the right of access to the justice system was 
fundamental and deemed necessary to the ability of citizens to assert, 
enforce, defend, and protect absolute rights.49  Unfortunately, the 
Washington Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence is less than 
cogent and hardly consistent when it comes to defining, characterizing, and 
identifying the source of a fundamental right of access to the court system.  
At one point the court firmly declared such a right existed and grounded it 
in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 4, and the equal protection 
guarantees read into Article I, Sec. 12.50  A year later, it reaffirmed the 
existence of the right, but concluded that it could not be grounded in either 
of the provisions relied upon in Carter I.51  The court in Carter then 
declared that there is no fundamental right of access to the courts,52 only to 
retreat from this novel observation a year later by acknowledging the 
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existence of such a right and by holding that the right includes a litigant’s 
ability to engage in pretrial discovery.53 Amazingly, given the state of 
constitutional development over more than a century, no case has expressly 
considered the obvious claim that the individual right of access to the courts 
arises under the most logical of provisions—Article I, Sec. 10.   
Nevertheless, and despite the Washington Supreme Court’s less than 
distinguished analysis over the years, the origins and purpose of the right of 
access to the courts along with its express embodiment in Washington’s 
constitution confirms its fundamental significance to the relationship 
between the citizens of the state and their government.  As a right 
conservative of all other substantive rights, it is essential to the ordered 
operation of society and the preservation of individual liberty.54   
D. Is the Right of Meaningful Access Individually Enforceable?   
Inherent in the natural rights of the individual citizen, and to the degree 
that it is essential to the assertion, defense, and enforcement of other 
important rights and prerogatives, the right of “meaningful access” to the 
courts of the state must be understood to be held by the individual and 
enforceable against the state.  If there is any ambiguity on this point, some 
additional constitutional provisions make this clear.   
First, both the open courts provision and the privileges and immunities 
clauses were written into the first article of the state constitution—that 
which is a declaration of the rights of individual citizens and the 
corresponding limitations on the powers of the government that was being 
constituted in the subsequent articles.  Thus, to the extent that rights and 
prohibitions are expressed in Article I, the reference is to the rights of 
individuals and prohibitions against the state that interfere with the free 
exercise of these rights.  
Second, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 29 declares that “[t]he 
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they 
are declared to be otherwise.”55  To the extent that Washington Constitution 
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Article I, Sec. 10 confirms the rights of citizens to meaningful access to the 
courts of the state, it also establishes a corresponding mandatory duty on the 
state—and, in particular, the state judiciary—to ensure that the courts are 
open, accessible, and that justice is freely administered without delay.  
Similarly, to the extent that Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 
prohibits the granting of special access to the courts for those able to afford 
the professional legal assistance required to effectively participate in these 
tribunals, the provision also constitutionally empowers those who are 
effectively denied meaningful access the right to demand the same.  
Finally, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 32 directs that a 
“frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to security of 
individual right.”56  Added at the last minute (and adapted from the 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and New Hampshire Constitutions),57 this provision is 
the vehicle through which the framers intended that natural law concepts 
continue to guide state constitutional interpretation.  In this context, it is the 
vehicle through which the Anglo-American understandings of the purpose, 
rationale, and enforceability of the right of access must be read into 
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10.58 
IV. INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: A 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
NON-CRIMINAL CASES IS NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE COURTS59 
In our adversarial system of justice the truth is determined by the neutral 
judge, magistrate, or jury.  The adversarial system is based on the idea that 
justice can be achieved only if the parties to a legal dispute are able to 
adduce their evidence and test their opponent’s evidence under conditions 
of reasonable equality.  The system is constructed on the premise that the 
assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an individual to meaningfully 
participate in the civil courts of this state.   This notion is reflected in the 
myriad rules and procedures applicable to civil practice in the courts, the 
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range of competencies required of those who practice in the civil courts, and 
the corresponding limitations on non-lawyer representation.  The failure to 
provide legal counsel to indigent unrepresented litigants fundamentally 
prejudices their right of “meaningful access” to the courts in matters in 
which they are (or should be) parties.  It also compromises the ability of the 
court to perform its essential constitutional function—to receive and 
objectively consider all the relevant facts and apply the applicable law in the 
matters before it to the end that justice is done.60   
There being no express reference of a right to counsel in non-criminal 
cases in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 (or any other 
provision),61 this article does not argue in favor of a universal right to 
counsel for indigents in all non-criminal cases.62  On the other hand, and in 
light of the central role that attorneys play in enabling the courts to perform 
their constitutional functions and to effectuate the individual right of 
“meaningful access” to the courts (embodied in Washington Constitution 
Article I, Sec. 10), there must be a substantially expanded understanding of 
the constitutional right and the corresponding duty of the courts to provide 
counsel to indigent litigants in non-criminal cases at public expense.   
 The Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 contemplates 
“meaningful access” as, “the capacity to appear and effectively participate 
in proceedings properly presented to the court in a manner that will allow 
the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the end that justice can be 
done.”  This definition commands two complementary areas of inquiry.  
The first focuses on the right and capacity of the individual to participate; 
the second focuses on the capacity of the tribunal to perform its 
constitutional function.  Consequently, in determining when, under what 
standard, and in what contexts counsel should be appointed at public 
expense to indigent litigants in non-criminal cases, the analysis must look to 
the intersecting constitutional obligations of the court to (a) respect and 
operationalize the individual’s Article I, Sec. 10 right of access and (b) 
ensure “the fair and impartial administration of justice [to the end] that 
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justice is done in the cases that come before [it],”63 and that it credibly 
serves as “the central mechanism for the orderly resolution of disputes that 
arise between citizens and between citizens and the government.”64 
Given the nature of the court system and the competencies required to 
participate effectively therein, the aforementioned constitutional 
considerations logically dictate the creation of a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of the appointment of counsel at public expense for indigent litigants 
in non-criminal cases.  Under this presumption, counsel should be 
appointed at public expense to unrepresented indigent persons who are 
forced to respond to a civil proceeding, or who must initiate civil 
proceedings in the courts of this state to assert and enforce their legal rights.  
The court may decline to appoint counsel only if it determines, on the basis 
of considerations relevant to the circumstances of the case, that (a) the 
unrepresented litigant can fairly and ably present and defend his or her case 
on relatively equal footing with the opposing side, and (b) the court can 
effectively discharge its duty to ensure that justice can be done in the matter 
before it.  These are independent inquiries. The first flows from the 
individual’s right of “meaningful access;” the second flows from the 
Washington Constitution Article IV duty of the court to ensure the fair and 
impartial administration of justice.  The duty to appoint counsel can only be 
avoided if the court finds that both conditions are met.   
The presumption will readily be overcome within some contexts.  An 
obvious example are cases that arise in small claims court, a judicial forum 
established by the Washington State Legislature to resolve cases involving 
relatively small (less than $4,000) amounts.65  Because the rules of the court 
are simple, forms are readily available, evidentiary issues are not complex, 
and the trial judge has been granted substantial latitude to deviate from the 
traditional neutral magistrate function to more of an inquisitor in service of 
finding a “right, just, and equitable” resolution of the controversy, the 
Legislature has concluded that the involvement of attorneys is neither 
necessary nor desirable in this forum.66  As conceived and operated within 
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the context of the limited jurisdiction of the forum and the issues presented 
therein, justice can generally be achieved without the assistance of counsel. 
Outside the small claims context, matters become more complex.  The 
key, then, is to develop a set of relevant criteria and a practical approach to 
their operation.  These criteria must be grounded in the realities of judicial 
practice and procedure and must be applied in a manner that facilitates the 
low-income67 individual’s right of “meaningful access” and ensures 
effective discharge of the constitutional duty of the court to ensure the fair 
and proper administration of justice.  They must also be applied in ways 
that recognize and respect the scarcity of public resources and avoid the 
expenditure of public funds for counsel in matters in which the private 
market should allow the individual to secure legal representation. 
A non-exclusive list of relevant considerations should, at a minimum, 
include: (1) the jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case 
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure, discovery, 
and evidence applicable to the proceeding; (2) the capacity of the litigant to 
develop and present evidence and legal arguments relevant to her claim and 
to respond to evidence and legal arguments presented by the other side; (3) 
complexity of the applicable law; (4) the practical consequences (in terms 
of outcomes realized) likely to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant 
as a result of not being represented by counsel in the proceeding (i.e., would 
the appointment of legal counsel likely make a significant difference in the 
outcome of the case?); (5) the availability of counsel on a pro bono or 
contingency fee basis; and (6) the importance of the issues presented from 
the perspective of the unrepresented litigant.   
In contrast to the first five considerations, the sixth involves a subjective 
inquiry into the importance of the matter from the perspective of the 
individual litigant.  The analysis is driven by the following question: If the 
unrepresented litigant had the resources, would she find the matter 
sufficiently important to purchase the services of an attorney?  To avoid its 
application in ways that render absurd results, the question must be used as 
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a guide to understanding when counsel should be appointed.  Because 
litigation can be motivated by a wide range of considerations, there are 
some who may make the subjective determination that they would “pay 
what it takes” to pursue a cause when a more “objective” person under 
similar circumstances might suggest that the benefits to be realized were not 
worth the costs involved.  While judges must exercise prudence and 
discretion in weighing this consideration, the analysis should mechanically 
operate in favor of the appointment of counsel in those cases where the 
opposing party has found the matter to be of sufficient importance to 
warrant his or her retention of counsel.  
Application of these six factors starts from the presumption that counsel 
is to be appointed.  The presumption may be overcome only if the court 
makes the following specific findings of fact: 
a) The nature of the case is such that, under the market conditions 
prevailing in the jurisdiction, a private attorney would normally 
be willing to take the matter on a contingency fee basis;68 or 
b) The court has identified a pro bono attorney able and willing to 
represent the litigant in the matter before the court;69 or 
c) The matter is neither factually nor legally complex and the 
litigant has the resources, education, experience, substantive 
knowledge, and intellectual capacity to effectively present, 
promote, and defend her legal interests; and  
d) In the absence of attorney representation, it can be expected that 
the relevant facts will be adduced and the appropriate legal 
arguments on both sides will be presented such that the court 
can perform its constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done. 
 So, how will this analysis work in the context of cases typical of those 
experienced by low-income people in Washington State?  A couple of 
examples are helpful.   
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Example 1: 
 This example involves the case of a family in conflict.  The parents have 
separated; there are claims of domestic violence; domestic violence 
protection orders have previously been issued; there are young children at 
issue who allegedly have witnessed the violence and abuse; the father is 
working and makes a living wage; the mother and children have been 
forced to leave the home and currently reside in a community-based shelter; 
the mother is not working and has no income.  The father has retained an 
attorney and initiated divorce proceedings.  He seeks primary residential 
placement of the children, limitations on contact between the children and 
their mother, child support, and award of the family home.  Both parents 
have high school educations.  The mother has been served with an ex parte 
temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why the court 
should not enter a further order awarding temporary residential placement 
of the children with the father, limiting her access to the children, and 
directing that she stay away from the family home.  The mother cannot 
afford legal counsel.  She has filed a declaration stating that she has been 
unsuccessful in her effort to secure assistance from both the local legal aid 
program (intake is closed) and the pro bono program.  An analysis of the 
relevant considerations follows: 
1.   Jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case 
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure, 
discovery, and evidence applicable to the proceeding.   
The superior court is a constitutional court of record with original and 
exclusive jurisdiction in all family law matters.70  The court has statutory 
authority to entertain the father’s request and grant appropriate relief.  
Practice in the superior court is governed by myriad rules (state and local), 
timelines, and procedures.  The judge presides in the capacity of a neutral 
magistrate, with responsibility to hear, weigh, and decide the case on the 
basis of the information that comes before it.  The judge may not help one 
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side or the other present his or her case or otherwise engage in any conduct 
that manifests bias in favor of a party litigant.71 
Family law practice in the superior court is governed by numerous 
statutes,72 including the Civil Rules (CR’s) and the local rules applicable in 
the county.  Discovery rules are applicable as are the Rules of Evidence 
(ER’s).  While some judges grant latitude to pro se litigants, effective 
development and presentation of the mother’s case requires substantial 
familiarity of and a corresponding ability to comply with these rules.  The 
mother’s lack of knowledge and understanding of these rules places her at a 
decided disadvantage.  This is particularly true where, as in this instance, 
the opposing party is represented by counsel learned in the rules and who 
will, consistent with his duty of zealous representation, seek to use the 
mother’s inability to comply with applicable rules, procedures, and 
evidentiary requirements to his client’s advantage.  
2.   The mother’s capacity to develop and present evidence and legal 
arguments relevant to her claim and respond to evidence and legal 
arguments presented by the other side.   
The mother is a high school graduate, untutored in family law statutes, 
case law, practice, and procedure.  Access to a courthouse facilitator73 or 
other sources of self-help assistance74 may result in her ability to obtain 
necessary forms and copies of applicable court rules.      
Because the father is represented by counsel, the advantage in presenting 
claims, evidence, and defenses tips decidedly in his favor.  Even if the 
mother, in her pro se capacity, is able to secure an order appointing a 
guardian ad litem (GAL) to make an independent assessment of the needs 
of the children and make recommendations regarding residential placement, 
limitations, and support, she remains at a significant disadvantage when it 
comes to developing her evidence, having the evidence admitted, 
conducting discovery, cross-examining the father and his witnesses, cross-
examining the GAL and others, defending against hostile cross-
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examination, and subpoenaing and protecting the witnesses she may bring 
on her behalf.75   
3.   Complexity of the law applicable to the dispute (statutes, 
regulations, case law, etc.).   
A wealth of statutes, regulations, court rules, and case law will govern the 
disposition of the legal and factual issues relating to the dissolution, 
including the terms of the parenting plan, whether and what restrictions or 
limitations on contact between the parents and the children are indicated, 
the amount of child support, the allocation of community and non-
community property, and other matters arising from the dissolution of the 
parties’ marriage.76  The mother in this case is a lay person untrained and 
unschooled in the art of reading and applying case law.  Even if she can 
access applicable statutes and court rules, she will not know how to access, 
understand the implications of, and use case law to her advantage. 
4.   The practical consequences (in terms of outcomes realized) likely 
to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant as a result of not 
being represented by counsel in the proceeding. 
 Resolution of this case will directly affect core rights and interests of the 
mother, not the least of which will be the nature and scope of her 
relationship with her children.  The father has filed for dissolution and 
primary residential placement.  He seeks limitations on the mother’s contact 
with the children and award of the family home.  There is a real legal and 
factual contest here.  Absent the assistance of counsel, the mother will be 
unable to develop and present her evidence, defend herself in the initial 
temporary hearing, meet and contest the father’s proofs, and establish an 
evidentiary basis for securing an award of primary residential placement 
and other appropriate relief.  Justice, which is otherwise unavailable in the 
absence of legal counsel, would be within the mother’s reach upon 
appointment of counsel.  
5.   The importance of the issues presented from the perspective of the 
unrepresented litigant.   
Meaningful Access to the Courts 407 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
The central issue involves the mother’s rights to residential placement of, 
and contact with, her children.  This is a profoundly personal matter that 
implicates core family considerations.  While not a parental rights 
termination proceeding,77 the relief requested by the father would, if 
granted, substantially limit the mother’s statutory rights and constitutionally 
protected liberties78 to care, support, provide for, and experience the 
companionship of her children.  Moreover, to the extent that the father 
seeks an award of child support and transfer of the family home to him, the 
relief requested will also directly affect the mother’s future economic 
conditions and her housing situation.  Surely, if the mother had the 
resources, she would retain counsel in this case. 
6. The availability of counsel on a pro bono or contingency fee basis. 
 The mother filed a declaration affirming the unavailability of legal aid 
and pro bono assistance.  Contingency fees are not authorized in family law 
cases.79   
Absent the assistance of counsel, the proceeding is likely to be a 
decidedly one-sided affair and, despite the best efforts of the trial judge, a 
judicial farce.  No lay person in the mother’s position could be expected to 
effectively defend herself against the claims and underlying allegations that 
have been made against her, and to effectively assert and enforce her legal 
rights in the proceeding.   Nor can the court perform its constitutional 
function.  The court is prohibited from developing evidence for the mother.  
Yet, it is duty-bound to decide the case on the evidence properly admitted.  
In this case, properly admitted evidence will most likely be limited to the 
evidence presented by the father’s attorney.  Justice cannot be done when 
only one side of the story is told.     
Applying the considerations set forth above, the presumption in favor of 
the appointment of counsel cannot be rebutted in this case.   Pro bono 
counsel is unavailable, and the matter is not one for which a private attorney 
can undertake representation on a contingency fee basis.  The matter is 
factually and legally complex.  The mother does not have the resources, 
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education, experience, substantive knowledge, and intellectual capacity to 
effectively present, promote, and defend her legal interests.  Finally, in the 
absence of attorney representation, it cannot be expected that the relevant 
facts will be adduced, and it cannot be expected that the appropriate legal 
arguments on both sides will be presented such that the court can perform 
its constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done.  Under the 
circumstances presented here, it becomes the state’s responsibility to 
provide counsel at public expense, because it established and maintains the 
judicial system within which the mother’s rights are to be adjudicated. 
Example 2: 
 A case recently reported by the Northwest Justice Project is 
representative of another of the many types of cases where legal counsel is 
necessary to effectuate the right of “meaningful access” guaranteed by 
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10.80  Many low-income individuals 
and families face legal problems relating to their ability to acquire or retain 
permanent shelter.81  This case involves an eviction proceeding filed by a 
landlord against a woman whose father had broken into her apartment and 
assaulted her friend.  While the father was arrested and jailed for the 
criminal assault, the landlord determined that the breach of peace associated 
with the assault violated the terms of the woman’s lease.  Represented by an 
attorney, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer proceeding.  He claimed a 
right to evict both on the basis of the events surrounding the assault, and 
also on the basis of non-payment of rent (despite the fact that rent had been 
prepaid and that the tenant actually had a credit on her account).  The 
individual in this case was lucky; she was able to secure the assistance of a 
state-funded legal aid attorney.  But many others like her are not as lucky, 
and they are forced to defend themselves against similar claims without 
legal help.  The following analysis assumes that counsel was not available 
and the indigent tenant, unable to afford private counsel, was faced with the 
prospect of proceeding alone.   
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1. Jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case 
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure, 
discovery, and evidence applicable to the proceeding.    
 The superior court has original jurisdiction in unlawful detainer 
proceedings.82  Resorting to self-help is no longer sanctioned by state law.83  
Therefore, the unlawful detainer procedure is the exclusive means of 
involuntarily terminating a tenancy and restoring the landlord to possession.  
Practice before the court is governed by a myriad of state and local rules, 
timelines, and procedures.  The judge presides in the capacity of a neutral 
magistrate with responsibility to hear, weigh, and decide the case on the 
basis of the information that comes before it.  The judge may not help one 
side or the other.   
The unlawful detainer proceeding is a special statutory process 
established to quickly address disputes regarding rights to possession of 
property under lease.84  The statutory process is highly technical.85  
Proceedings are subject to the Civil Rules and the Evidence Rules.  In this 
type of proceeding, there is a limited ability to conduct discovery, and 
proceedings before the court are often quite summary.  Strict time limits 
apply; non-compliance can result in the summary grant of a writ of 
restitution despite the defendant having good legal or factual defenses.86 
Failure to timely respond, or to respond appropriately, will result in the 
summary issuance of a writ of restitution, depriving the tenant of her right 
to continue to live in the apartment.87  While the matter may ultimately 
proceed to a trial on the merits, she will have been deprived of the single 
most important aspect of her right—the right to continue to live in the 
apartment.  She risks not only of the loss of the motion for issuance of the 
writ but, as a direct consequence of such loss  the prospect of homelessness.  
If the writ wrongly issues and is executed, no subsequent relief can undo the 
harm that she will have experienced.    
410 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
2. The tenant’s capacity to develop and present evidence and legal 
arguments relevant to her defense and respond to evidence and 
legal arguments presented by the landlord.   
 The tenant is unschooled in the law.  There are some self-help materials 
on-line to help the tenant draft and file a response.  However, given the 
complexity of the case and the corresponding statutory time lines involved, 
it is not likely that this tenant will be able to prepare and timely file the 
necessary documents to defend her tenancy. 
Because the landlord is represented by counsel, he has a substantial 
advantage in presenting his claim of right to possession. In contrast, the 
unrepresented tenant might miss necessary deadlines, fail to properly 
authenticate or submit evidence on time, or otherwise be unable to present 
necessary legal and factual arguments because she is ignorant of relevant 
substantive law88 and legal process as well as the special statutory process 
applicable to unlawful detainer actions.   
3. Complexity of the law applicable to the dispute (statutes, 
regulations, case law, etc.).   
 In addition to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and the Unlawful 
Detainer Act, the tenant has rights under numerous other statutes, including 
state and federal fair housing statutes. Additionally, substantial case law has 
developed in the area.  In this case, recent amendments to the Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Act provided a substantive defense to the eviction.89  In 
the absence of effective legal assistance, it is unlikely that a defense based 
on the tenant’s status as a victim of violence would ever be identified or 
asserted. 
4. The practical consequences (in terms of outcomes realized) 
likely to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant as a result 
of not being represented by counsel in the proceeding.   
There is no question that the assistance of legal counsel would have a 
material effect on the outcome of this case.  The tenant had both legal and 
factual defenses.90  Without legal counsel, she would in all likelihood 
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neither know of nor understand the process by which she could perfect her 
ability to assert these defenses.  Legal assistance would be the difference 
between continued residency in her apartment or homelessness. 
5. The importance of the issues presented from the perspective of 
the unrepresented litigant.   
 At issue is the tenant’s right to continued residency in the apartment 
under the terms and conditions of her lease.  If the landlord is successful, 
the tenant faces eviction and homelessness.  From the subjective perspective 
of the tenant, the threat to her ability to remain in safe, secure housing is 
significant.  If she had the resources, she would no doubt seek the assistance 
of legal counsel. 
6. The availability of counsel on a pro bono or contingency fee 
basis. 
 The facts of this case presume that legal aid services are not available.  
Due to the fact that the proceeding is being limited to adjudication of the 
competing claims to possession, there is no potential damages award from 
which a contingency fee could reasonably be secured.  
As with the previously discussed case, the circumstances of the present 
case compel the appointment of counsel.  No court could make the findings 
necessary to overcome the constitutional presumption in favor of a right to 
counsel.  Pro bono counsel is not available nor is there a potential for 
contingency fee representation.  Undertaking the relevant inquiry, the 
circumstances of the case would compel judicial findings that (a) the matter 
is factually and legally complex; (b) the tenant does not have the resources, 
education, experience, substantive knowledge, and intellectual capacity to 
effectively present, promote, and defend her legal interests; and (c) in the 
absence of attorney representation, it cannot reasonably be expected that (i) 
the relevant facts will be adduced, and (ii) the appropriate legal arguments 
on both sides will be presented such that the court can perform its 
constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done.  Consequently, in this 
statutorily mandated legal proceeding, the guarantee of “meaningful access” 
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embodied in Washington Constitution, Article I, Sec. 10 requires the 
appointment of legal counsel to represent the indigent tenant.   
The cases described above are representative of the wide range of cases 
where the constitutional presumption in favor of a right to counsel should 
hold.  While judges in some cases may find that counsel is available on 
either a pro bono or contingency fee basis, it must be anticipated that legal 
counsel will have to be appointed for the substantial majority of indigent 
litigants whose cases involve important personal and family interests, rights 
relating to housing, enforcement of laws relating to discrimination and 
protection of civil rights, access to governmental assistance, health care 
(including mental health care), educational services, and other cases where 
the opposing party is represented by legal counsel.   
V.  THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-
CRIMINAL CASES PROTECTS AGAINST THE STATE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY GRANTING UNMERITED SPECIAL RIGHTS 
AND PRIVILEGES OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS IN FAVOR THOSE WHO 
CAN AFFORD TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL. 
The right of “meaningful access” to the justice system for  enforcement 
and defense of important rights is an outgrowth of the Anglo-American 
natural rights legal philosophy upon which our state and federal 
constitutions are grounded.  Originating in the promises of Article 40 of the 
Magna Carta91 and affirmed by many states in their constitutions well-prior 
to the ratification of the federal Constitution,92 an unfettered and meaningful 
right of access to the courts of the state was understood to be essential to the 
ability of the citizens to secure and defend their rights, liberties, and 
property.  Thus, even in the absence of a separate constitutional provision 
confirming and making it individually enforceable, the right of “meaningful 
access” to the courts is so central to and conservative of other personal 
rights that it must be understood to be both fundamental and incidental to 
the rights that flow from one’s status as a citizen of the state.  This latter 
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point—that free and “meaningful access” to the justice system is a right 
incidental to citizenship—is central to a claim that failure to provide 
counsel in those cases where counsel is necessary to secure “meaningful 
access” to the court93 violates the privileges and immunities clause of 
Washington State’s Constitution.94 
Article I, Sec. 12 of Washington’s Constitution directs that “[n]o law 
shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other 
than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall 
not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”95  In the absence of a 
state constitutional provision that parallels the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, this provision has historically served as the source 
of state-based equal protection constitutional inquiries.96  In recent years, 
and in response to a crescendo of academic encouragement97 and 
jurisprudential developments in the states from which Washington’s 
privileges and immunities clause was borrowed,98 the Washington Supreme 
Court has determined that Article I, Sec. 12 is capable of serving as an 
independent source of protection for certain individual rights and that it may 
be interpreted to impose a corresponding set of limitations on state 
governmental conduct.99    
Grant County II involved a challenge to the statutory petition method for 
municipal annexations.  While upholding the statutory scheme under 
challenge in the case, the Washington Supreme Court for the first time 
expressly held that the special privileges and immunities prohibition 
embodied in Article I, Sec. 12 was intended to offer protection distinct from 
that available under traditional equal protection analysis, and that an 
independent inquiry is appropriate to determine whether governmental 
action affords special rights and privileges in violation of that section.100   
According to the court, a violation of the prohibition against special 
privileges and immunities in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12101 
will be found if the law, or its application, confers a “privilege” to a 
particular class of citizens to the exclusion of others.  Thus, the inquiry 
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turns to what is a “privilege” within the meaning of the state constitution.  
The court defined privileges as “those fundamental rights that are incidental 
to state citizenship.”102  The court quoted with approval its early 
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause in State v. Vance,103 
where it held that: 
The privileges and immunities therein referred to pertain alone to 
those fundamental rights which belong to the citizens of the state 
by reason of such citizenship. These terms, as they are used in the 
constitution of the United States, secure in each state to the citizens 
of all states the right to remove to and carry on business therein; 
the right, by usual modes, to acquire and hold property, and to 
protect and defend the same in the law; the rights to the usual 
remedies to collect debts, and to enforce other personal rights; and 
the right to be exempt, in property or persons, from taxes or 
burdens which the property or persons of citizens of some other 
state are exempt from.104 
The quoted language from Vance places the right of “meaningful access” 
to the courts in its proper Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 context 
and affirms that, regardless of its source (i.e., whether originating in the 
common law, as a result of “recourse to fundamental rights” or the language 
of Article I, Sec. 10), such a right is a “privilege” within the meaning of that 
clause.  According to the court, “privileges” protected by Washington 
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 are those “fundamental rights which belong 
to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship.”  It affirms that 
such rights include, but are not necessarily limited to, the right to “protect 
and defend [property] in the law; the rights to the usual remedies to collect 
debts, and to enforce other personal rights.”105       
Thus, even independent of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10, 
the right of “meaningful access” to the courts is a “privilege” within the 
meaning of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12.  But the inquiry 
does not end here.  One additional obstacle exists before it can be concluded 
that the protections offered by this provision manifest in an affirmative duty 
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on the part of the state to facilitate “meaningful access” to the courts for 
those unable to secure the professional legal assistance that is essential to 
their ability to effectively assert and defend their rights in the forum.  
The text of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 is prohibitive in its 
construction.  It reads “[n]o law shall be passed . . . ”  The framers of the 
constitution adopted this provision in part in response to concerns with the 
excesses and influences that private interests had obtained through the 
courting of special legislative favors.106  That the language prohibits 
affirmative legislative grants of special preferences is, therefore, not 
surprising.  But there is little difference between affirmative grants of 
special privileges, on the one hand, and passive conduct that, in the course 
of performing governmental functions, effectively confers special 
privileges, on the other.  Moreover, there is little distinction between 
legislative conduct in granting special privileges and executive or judicial 
conduct that accomplishes the same result.  All such conduct is repugnant to 
the purposes that the framers intended to accomplish; i.e., protection against 
governmental conduct that confers special, unmerited privileges and 
immunities.  It is also repugnant to the class of rights that it is designed to 
protect, i.e., those rights that are fundamental incidents of state citizenship.  
Whether active or passive, and whether legislative, executive, or judicial, all 
statues, rules, and procedures that effectively operate to confer special 
privileges or immunities relating to the exercise of fundamental rights 
incidental to citizenship must fall within the prohibitions of Washington 
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12.     
Part of the problem with current privileges and immunities 
jurisprudence—both in Washington and in those other states that undertake 
an independent analysis—is that the cases focus on challenges to 
affirmative legislative acts that grant special rights (‘undue favoritism’) or 
single out classes of individuals on the basis of some distinguishing 
characteristics.107  No case has considered the situation where the state 
1) undertakes to perform a constitutionally mandated function;108  
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2) does so in a palpably even-handed manner (i.e., does not 
expressly single out specific classes of citizens for favored 
treatment); 
3) employs rules and procedures that, on their face, apply generally 
to all without distinction; but 
4) in the course of performing the constitutional function in an 
even-handed manner, effectively erects insurmountable barriers 
to the ability of certain classes of citizens109 to avail themselves 
of the governmentally established and maintained enterprise, 
and 
5) as a consequence denies these same classes of persons 
fundamental rights;110 while  
6) exercising unmerited favoritism in providing access to the 
governmental enterprise.111  
 Yet, this is precisely the situation that exists with Washington State’s 
court system.   Washington Constitution Article IV establishes the judicial 
branch of state government and charges it with the fair and proper 
administration of justice.112  The court system that has developed is 
governed by complex substantive, evidentiary, and procedural rules which 
presume the availability and effective assistance of legal counsel.  These 
rules apply generally to all who come before the courts.  However, in doing 
so, they operate to foreclose “meaningful access” to the courts for those 
who are unable to secure legal counsel, while at the same time offering 
special advantages to those who have the assistance of an attorney.  As a 
consequence, the design, structure, and operation of the court system 
effectively confers unmerited special rights of access to those with the 
ability to secure legal counsel while effectively denying the fundamental 
right of access to those without this ability.   
The key, once again, is the interrelationship between the constitutionally 
mandated governmental function (establishment and maintenance of courts 
for the fair and impartial administration of justice) and the fundamental 
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right of “meaningful access” that all citizens have to it.  Where, as here, the 
right of access to a governmental enterprise (the court system) is 
fundamental, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 imposes upon the 
government that develops and maintains that enterprise an affirmative duty 
to ensure that such an enterprise is designed, operated, and maintained in a 
way that enables the citizenry to realize such a right of access.  Conversely, 
this provision prohibits the government from creating a court system that, 
on the one hand, inherently requires the assistance of legal counsel in order 
for citizens to effectively assert and defend legal rights and prerogatives but, 
on the other, refuses to provide such counsel where the citizen is unable to 
secure it on his or her own.  Such a system effectively operates to confer 
special rights of access to, and enjoyment of, the justice system (which is 
constitutionally mandated to be open to all) to those who can afford legal 
counsel at the expense of those who cannot.  
Under our constitutional form of government, the justice system is 
maintained by the judicial branch.113  The legitimacy of any system of 
justice is a function of its capacity to treat people equally before the law.  In 
the words of the Magna Carta, “[t]o no one will we sell, to no one will we 
refuse, or delay, right or justice.”114  Or, as Alexander Hamilton observed in 
Federalist Paper No. 78, the purpose of the judicial branch is “to secure a 
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”115 Impartiality is 
not achieved in a system which confers special privileges on one class of 
participants to the decided and systemic disadvantage of another. 
As the civil legal system is conceived, designed, structured, and 
maintained, lawyers are essential to parties’ effective participation in most 
types of proceedings hosted within that civil court system.  By designing a 
system that requires attorney representation to realize effective outcomes 
and, at the same time, declining to appoint counsel to indigent litigants in 
matters where counsel is essential to their ability to meaningfully participate 
in the proceeding, the judicial branch passively fosters special rights of 
access to the system.  This special right of access operates as a privilege 
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within the meaning of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 in favor 
of those who can afford legal counsel while effectively denying similar 
rights to those who cannot.  No affirmative statutory classification is 
employed to effectuate this distinction or grant of special privilege.  It 
inheres in the structure and design of the system itself.  Consequently, the 
system operates to deny the fundamental right of access to some while 
conferring unmerited special rights of access to others; in so doing, it 
unconstitutionally grants special rights and privileges in violation of 
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12. 
Here, as in the analysis under Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10, 
the overarching consideration is the right of “meaningful access.”  Just as 
the right does not manifest itself in an absolute right to appointed counsel 
for indigent litigants in all civil cases within the art. 1, sec. 10 analysis, 
neither does it under the privileges and immunities analysis of Washington 
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12.  The rebuttable presumption outlined in 
section IV above effectively ensures the appointment of counsel in those 
cases where legal representation is essential to the indigent litigant’s 
meaningful participation in the court proceeding while, at the same time, 
protecting against the appointment of counsel in cases where it is not 
constitutionally required.  
VI.  EMERGING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE PROVIDES 
COMPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FOR A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN 
NON-CRIMINAL CASES 
 The analytical approach to recognizing and enforcing the individual’s 
right of “meaningful access” to the courts under Washington Constitution 
Article I, Sec. 10 discussed above is consistent with the approach employed 
by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting a nearly identical 
provision of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Fundamental Freedoms.  Article 6-1 of the Convention reads in relevant 
part: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.116  
 Like Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10,117 Article 6-1 of the 
Convention does not affirmatively direct the appointment of counsel in civil 
or criminal cases.  It merely speaks to the right of individuals to “a fair and 
public hearing.”  Yet, two cases interpreting Article 6-1 make clear that, 
under the proper circumstances, the provision operates to require the 
appointment of counsel in a broad range of non-criminal cases.   
The first such case is Airey v. Ireland. 118  Seeking relief under the right 
of access to justice affirmed by Article 6, the petitioner in Airey sought 
appointment of counsel to petition the High Court of Ireland for a judicial 
separation from her husband.  Rejecting the Government of Ireland’s 
assertion that Ms. Airey’s personal circumstances (i.e., her poverty) created 
the barrier to her ability to secure otherwise authorized judicial relief, the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the appointment of counsel was 
mandatory to effectuate her “right of access” secured under Article 6-1 of 
the Convention.  The court looked to many of the factors outlined in the 
approach suggested in Section IV above, including the nature of the forum, 
the nature of the proceeding, the difficulties of proof and procedure, the 
nature of the petitioner’s rights at stake, and the likelihood that justice could 
be realized without the effective assistance of counsel.119  The court 
concluded that it is “most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s position 
[reference omitted] can effectively present his or her own case . . . [and that] 
the possibility of appearing before a court in person [i.e., pro se] before the 
High Court does not provide the applicant with an effective right of 
access.”120    
420 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Although it concluded that appointment of counsel was required under 
the totality of circumstances presented in Ms. Airey’s case, the court made 
clear that Ireland was not obligated to appoint counsel in all cases, and that 
it was free to develop such other approaches as it might deem appropriate to 
ensure that the citizens of that country have an effective right of access to 
the courts.  On this point, the court observed:  
[W]hilst Article 6-1 guarantees to litigants an effective right of 
access to the courts for the determination of their ‘civil rights and 
obligations,’ it leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be 
used towards this end. The institution of a legal aid scheme - which 
Ireland now envisages in family law matters . . . constitutes one of 
those means but there are others such as, for example, a 
simplification of procedure.121   
But, in the absence of alternative means, the court concluded that Ireland 
was required to appoint counsel to enable Ms. Airey to secure the legal 
separation to which she was entitled under the law.122 
A more recent case interpreting Article 6-1 is the case of Steel and 
Morris v. The United Kingdom.123  The case was a complex libel action 
filed by McDonalds Corporation against two London-based individuals, 
Helen Steel and David Morris, who had engaged in an active anti-
McDonalds publicity effort that, among other things, linked McDonalds’ 
practices to global rainforest defoliation and deforestation, economic 
exploitation, collusion with corrupt third world nation leaders, exploitation 
of children, and inhumane slaughterhouse practices.124  McDonalds sued the 
two seeking £100,000 in damages.  Filed in 1990, the case involved 
multiple motions, more than twenty-eight days of hearings, and a trial that 
lasted 313 days.  The defendants were denied counsel through the British 
Office of Legal Aid and, for the most part, defended themselves without the 
extended assistance of counsel.125  McDonalds prevailed at the trial and,  
when the case was revised on appeal, judgments were entered in the amount 
of £36,000 against Ms. Steel and £40,000 against Mr. Morris.126  After 
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exhausting all domestic appeals, Steel and Morris appealed to the European 
Court of Human Rights, alleging among other things that the denial of legal 
assistance operated to deprive them of their rights to a fair hearing within 
the meaning of Article 6-1 of the Convention. 
The court evaluated the case under the criteria outlined in Airey, and 
concluded that, under the circumstances presented in the case, the denial of 
legal assistance to Ms. Steel and Mr. Morris violated Article 6-1.127  The 
court first affirmed that the right of access to court in a democratic society 
is ensured by the right to a fair trial.  Citing its decision in Airey, the court 
stated, “It is central to the concept of a fair trial, in civil as in criminal 
proceedings, that a litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or her 
case effectively before the court and that he or she is able to enjoy equality 
of arms with the opposing side.”128  Characterizing the state of the law with 
respect to the right to counsel under Article 6-1 of the Convention, the 
Court continued: 
Article 6-1 leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used 
in guaranteeing litigants the above rights. The institution of a legal 
aid scheme constitutes one of those means but there are others, 
such as for example simplifying the applicable procedure.  
The question whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair 
hearing must be determined on the basis of the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case and will depend inter alia upon the importance 
of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of 
the relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent him 
or herself effectively.129 
The benchmark in determining whether and under what circumstances 
Article 6-1 requires appointment of counsel is whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, “each side is afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present his or her case under conditions that do not place him or her at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the adversary.” 130  The court identified a 
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number of indicators in determining whether, under the circumstances of 
any given case, counsel would be required.  These included:   
• whether the litigants initiated proceedings or were forced by the 
conduct of others (those who sued them) to defend important 
rights and prerogatives in a forum chosen by those who initiated 
the action;131     
• the nature of the legal rights at issue (the court observed, for 
example, that a case involving family relations is presumptively 
important because it not only affects the rights and relations 
between the two litigants, but also has implications for any 
children of the relationship);132  
• whether potential financial implications may, in light of other 
circumstances, so threaten personal rights of the parties as to 
require the effective assistance of legal counsel (i.e., legal aid 
may be required even in cases where damages are the only relief 
requested);133 
• the complexity of substantive law and legal procedure.134  
Indicators include the number of witnesses, volume of 
transcript, duration of proceedings, number of motions filed, 
amount of documentary evidence required to be produced, the 
existence of highly technical factual materials, the length of the 
judgments entered in the case, etc.;  
• the extent to which the unrepresented party is able to bring an 
effective defense despite the absence of legal counsel.135 
• the extent to which there is a disparity between the respective 
levels of legal assistance enjoyed by the parties and the degree 
to which such disparity would, under the totality of the 
circumstances of the case, give rise to unfairness, despite the 
best efforts of the judges who preside over the proceedings; and 
• whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the lack of 
access to legal counsel operates to deprive the party of the 
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opportunity to present his or her case effectively before the court 
and, as a consequence, contribute to an unacceptable inequality 
of arms with the opposing party.136   
Applying these criteria to the facts of the proceeding before it, the court 
concluded that counsel should have been appointed to defend Ms. Steel and 
Mr. Morris against the libel charges filed against them.137 
The parallels between Article 6-1 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article I, Sec. 10 of the 
Washington Constitution are manifest.  The former declares that “everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  The latter declares 
that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without 
unnecessary delay.”  The Convention requires appointment of counsel in 
cases where the unrepresented litigant would be placed at a decided 
disadvantage in presenting his or her claims to the tribunal and in meeting 
the proofs offered by the other side (i.e., Airey, Steel and Morris).  
Grounded in similar philosophy and legal traditions, Washington 
Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 must be read to require the same.  The 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the appointment of counsel outlined in 
section IV above effectively serves this end. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Washington State’s civil court system was established and is maintained 
to enable citizens of the state to secure a fair, proper, and effective 
resolution to their civil disputes.   Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 
10 promises that the civil court system will be “open and available to all” 
for the resolution of disputes “without delay.” 
In practical operation, the court system is neither open nor available to 
those who often need its protection the most: low-income individuals facing 
civil legal problems implicating the most critical of life’s necessities such as 
shelter, personal safety, personal and familial security, and governmental 
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accountability.  For these people, the lack of access to legal counsel 
routinely deprives them of the ability to defend, assert, and enforce 
“absolute” rights to individual and family security, personal liberty, and 
private property.  Maintenance of a judicial system that  requires the 
effective assistance of counsel for  a fair and proper defense or assertion of 
legal rights and prerogatives and then fails to provide counsel to those who 
cannot afford it threatens to transform the judicial system into a province 
where justice will be available only to those with resources.  If this threat 
remains unaddressed, the judicial system will lose the credibility necessary 
to preserve its very legitimacy and, with it, the essential character of our 
legal tradition so boldly carved into the parapet of the United States 
Supreme Court building—Equal Justice Under Law. 
Washington State’s Constitution confers a right of meaningful access to 
the judicial system upon all its citizens.  Within the legacy of Anglo-
American natural law-based legal traditions, the right of meaningful access 
is a fundamental incident of citizenship.  This right is individually 
enforceable and is grounded in those constitutional provisions which require 
open courts, which mandate recurrent resort to fundamental principles, and 
which prohibit conferring special privileges.  It dictates the appointment of 
counsel at public expense in those cases where such is necessary to allow an 
indigent litigant to appear and effectively participate in a proceeding in a 
manner that will allow the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the 
end that justice is done. 
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26 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
27 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at 120-21 (emphasis in original). 
28 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis supplied).  Washington State’s first draft 
constitution (drafted by a convention that convened in Walla Walla in 1878 and ratified 
by the citizenry, but not approved by Congress) expressly embraced the natural law basis 
of government that runs uninterrupted through the Anglo-American experience and the 
fundamentality of “absolute rights” to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.  
Article V, section Art. I, sec. 1 of the draft constitution declared that “[a]ll political power 
is inherent in the people, and all free governments were founded on their authority.”  
WASH. CONST.  art. V, § 1 (proposed draft 1878).  Article V, section . . .”  Art. I, sec. 3 
observed that:  
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All persons are by nature free, and equally entitled to certain natural rights; 
among which are, those of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and seeking and obtaining 
happiness.  To secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.   
Id. at. § 3. 
The grounding of the 1889 constitution in natural rights philosophy is affirmed by the 
contemporaneous writings of W. Lair Hill, the most influential non-delegate to the 1889 
Constitutional Convention.  On the eve of the convening of the Constitutional 
Convention, Hill published a draft constitution and accompanying commentary in the 
Portland Oregonian and provided a copy to every delegate to the convention.  Much of 
Hill’s original language found its way into the constitution that was ratified by the people 
of Washington Territory, and his contemporaneous rationale and historical insights shed 
substantial light on the philosophy that guided the convention’s delegates as they worked 
to craft the proposed constitution.  As Hill observed in his discussion on the extent to 
which state power should be crystallized in the constitutions, those who craft and adopt a 
constitution determine:  
how far natural liberty shall be subjected to the common necessities of law and 
order, and what restrictions shall be placed upon the selection of methods, by 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority, for the enforcement and 
protection of private rights and the promotion of public good. . . . All 
government is a system of compromises, and all true statesmanship is in the 
wise differentiating between personal liberty and that degree of personal 
restraint which is necessary to the orderly conduct of public affairs, the 
preservation of peace, and the promotion of those common interests in which a 
whole society, as contradistinguished from the individual member, is 
concerned.  
W. Lair Hill, Washington: A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State, MORNING 
OREGONIAN, July 4, 1889, at v-vi.  Speaking of the purpose of a Bill of Rights, Hill 
observes, “[i]t has been universally deemed expedient and proper to formulate and 
embody in the constitution an assertion of these natural rights of man, and to declare in 
those provisions specifically under what circumstances and to what extent such rights 
must yield to social requirements.”  Id. at vii. 
29 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at 137 (English italics supplied, Latin italics in original, 
underscoring supplied). 
30 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
31 Chambers v. Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
32 SMITH, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasis added). 
33 The right-remedy relationship is captured in the common law rule ubi jus, ibi 
remedium – where there is a wrong, there is a remedy.  This rule has long been embraced 
by the Washington Supreme Court.  See Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 795 (Wash. 1996) 
(Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 355 P.2d 781 (Wash. 
1960)). 
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34 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
35 Major Prods. Co. v. Northwest Harvest Prods, 979 P.2d 905, 907 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999), review denied 989 P.2d 1141 (Wash. 1999).  Thus, the supreme court asserts and 
exercises its rule making authority “to promote justice by ensuring a fair and expeditious 
process.”  WASH. ST. CT. GENERAL. R. 9(a).  Accord WASH. EVID. E.R. 102 (stating that 
the rules of evidence “shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination 
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law 
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined”); WASH. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 1 (stating that Civil Rules for superior court 
are to be interpreted to the end of achieving a “just . . . determination of every action”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.180 (2005) (stating that the supreme court  has an affirmative 
responsibility to adopt rules of practice and procedure that are “most conducive to the due 
administration of justice”). 
36 Limiting access to the law along these lines would, however, not be without historical 
parallel, one that resulted in a successful public demand for access.  During the period 
following restoration of the Roman Constitution, a closed judicial system was established 
where knowledge of the laws and legal practice was held exclusively by patrician 
magistrates but was unavailable to the plebeians.  This continued until the plebeians 
threatened to leave town en mass (the so-called Second Secession of the Plebs) until the 
patrician magistrates agreed to inscribe the laws on twelve bronze tablets which were set 
up in the marketplace for all to see.    H. F. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 12 (2d ed. reprinted 1954). 
37 Even prisoners have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right of access to the 
law and necessary legal materials.  State v. Dougherty, 655 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1982) (citing with approval Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1971), “the 
fundamental right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in 
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”). 
38 Carter v. Univ. of Wash., 536 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975) [hereinafter Carter I].  While the 
holding in Carter I was overruled a year later in Housing Authority, Justice Finley’s 
observations in the former case relating to the purpose and functions of the court system 
endure with increasing relevancy. 
39 Or, in the language of Justice Finley in Carter I, 536 P.2d at 620-621, “effective 
access.” 
40 Cf. Iverson, 517 P.2d 197.  Under Washington Constitution article VI, section 1 and 
section 30, it is the duty of the judiciary to ensure “the fair and impartial administration 
of justice and the duty to see that justice is done in the cases that come before the court.”  
Id. 
41 Most of these state constitutional provisions predate the Oregon and Indiana 
constitutions from which Washington’s open courts provision originated.  See, e.g.,WIS. 
CONST. art. I, § sec. 9 (“Remedy for wrongs. SECTION 9. Every person is entitled to a 
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, 
property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to 
the laws.”) MINN. CONST. art. I, § sec. 8 (“REDRESS OF INJURIES OR WRONGS). 
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Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which 
he may receive to his person, property, or character, and to obtain justice freely and 
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, 
conformable to the laws.”); OHIO CONST. §sec. 1.16 (“All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or 
delay.”); KY. CONST. §sec. 14 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay”). 
42 WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 10. 
43 Id.  The language of article I, section 10 is more succinct than that included in the draft 
Constitution of 1878.  The language in the 1878 Constitution more closely tracked the 
more expansive language embodied in other state constitutions.  Article V, sec. I, sec. 9 
of that Constitution provided that: 
[e]very person in the State shall be entitled to a certain remedy in the law, for 
all wrongs and injuries which he may receive in his person, character or 
property; justice shall be administered to all freely and without purchase; 
completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; and all courts 
shall be open to the public.  
Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § sec. 10, (stating that “[n]o court shall be secret, but justice 
shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and 
every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, 
property, or reputation.”).  While employing different language, there is nothing in the 
constitutional deliberations of the 1889 convention (see generally, THE JOURNAL OF THE 
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow 
ed., 1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF CONVENTION]) to suggest that the drafters intended 
to deviate in either purpose or substance from the right expressed in the earlier 
constitutional endeavor or that which was embodied in the constitutions of Washington’s 
sister states.  See generally, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
JOURNAL OF CONVENTION].  The provision is clearly intended to carry forward the two 
great promises of Anglo-American tradition—(1) full access to the courts by all citizens 
“without purchase” (in the language of the Magna Carta, the 1878 draft, and the Hill 
draft), so that all may effectively assert and defend personal rights and secure timely 
access to a remedy at law,  (see King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 16 P.3d 45, 57-58 (Wash.  
Ct. App. 2000); and (2) maintenance of a justice system that is open and subject to public 
scrutiny, and freedom from star chamber-like proceedings or other secret trials. 
44 See Bullock v. Roberts, 524 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1974) (access to the courts in a 
dissolution action is a fundamental right); Whitney v. Buckner, 734 P.2d 485, 488-489 
(Wash. 1987) (absent a countervailing state interest, even prisoners, who have lost many 
civil rights upon conviction and incarceration, must be “afforded meaningful access to 
the courts”).  Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); King, 16 
P.3d at 57-58; State v. Dorsey, 914 P.2d 773, 776-77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (persons 
required to settle disputes through the judicial process must be afforded “meaningful 
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access” to the courts).  The decisions in Whitney and Dorsey were not grounded in the 
article. I, sec. 10, but in traditional notions of due process.  Nevertheless, they affirm that 
a right of meaningful access to the courts exists in Washington State. 
45 In exchange for the grant of governing powers to the state—including the power to 
establish and maintain a system of justice—the citizen reserves such rights and liberties 
that have not been conceded, as well as the right of access to the system of justice for the 
effective assertion and defense of such rights and liberties.  Richard Sanders & Barbara 
Mahoney, Restoration of Limited State Constitutional Government: A Dissenter’s View, 
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 269 (2003). 
46 Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199 (saying “Const. art. IV, s. 1 and s. 30, vests the judicial power 
in the supreme court, court of appeals, and superior courts of this state.  Upon creation, 
these courts assumed certain powers and duties. [citations omitted].  These duties include, 
among others, the fair and impartial administration of justice and the duty to see that 
justice is done in the cases that come before the court”) 
47 See Justice Finley’s observations in Carter I., 536 P.2d at 620-21. 
48 Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199. 
49 See discussion and text, supra notes 12-17. 
50 Carter I, 536 P.2d at 625. 
51 Housing Authority, 557 P.2d at 327 (observing that “[a]ccess to the courts is amply 
and expressly protected by other provisions”). 
52 Carter I, 536 P.2d.  Accord Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 800 P.2d at 367 (Wash. 1990). 
53 Doe, 819 P.2d (though no source of the right itself is disclosed). 
54 See Miranda, 991 P.2d at 687 (“[T]he right of access to the courts is fundamental to 
our system of justice.  Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights.” [citation 
omitted] .  “ . . . [M]eaningful access requires representation.  Where rights and 
responsibilities are adjudicated in the absence of representation, the results are often 
unjust.  If representation is absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is justice, 
and for the same reason.”). 
55 That the provisions of the Constitution were intended, through the operation of 
Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. I,  section 29 to be individually enforceable, 
was confirmed by Convention Delegate (and later Supreme Court Justice) Theodore 
Stiles.  Writing nearly twenty-five years after the 1889 convention, Stiles observed:  
There have been some excellent provisions in the constitution from which the 
people have had no benefit, because they depend for operation upon action by 
the legislature, and that body has neglected to do its duty in the premises.  
Considering that by section 29 of the first article every direction contained in 
the constitution is mandatory unless expressly declared to be otherwise, it is at 
least surprising that in some instances no attempt has been made whatever to 
set these provisions at their legitimate work. 
Theodore L. Stiles, Effects of State Constitution on Public Interests, WASHINGTON 
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. IV, No. 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 286 (1913). 
56 WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32. 
57 See JOURNAL OF CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 516-17 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed. 
1999). These referenced provisions were not unique to Wisconsin, Illinois or New 
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Hampshire.  They incorporate and carry forward an uninterrupted history of state 
constitutions expressly recognizing fundamental principles as tools for constitutional 
interpretation as society evolves.  See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (asserting 
“[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, 
moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the 
blessings of liberty, and keep a government free: the people ought therefore to pay 
particular attention to these points in the choice of officers and representatives, and have 
a right to exact a due and constant regard to them, from their legislatures and magistrates, 
in the making and executing such laws as are necessary for the good government of the 
state.”) (emphasis supplied); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 15 (asserting “[t]hat no free 
government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm 
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles.”) (emphasis supplied). 
58 For further discussion on this point, see Perluss, supra note 1312, at 584.  See also 
State v. Seeley, 940 P.2d 604, 621 (Wash. 1997) (noting that art. I, sec. 32 is most often 
employed by the courts as an “interpretive mechanism” to determine the substance and 
scope of individual rights that find their origins under natural rights theory); Brian Snure, 
Comment, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, Free 
Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 669, 676 (1992). 
59 This discussion does not look to (nor is it bound by) precedent interpreting the due 
process, equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the federal constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Washington State stands in relation to the federal 
government as a co-equal grantor of powers.  In this sense, it predates the federal 
constitution and is host to the first line of delegated sovereignty and constitutional 
inquiry.   Given the hierarchy of sovereignty relationships and conferrals of authority in 
our federal system (i.e., the people grant limited sovereignty to the state, which in turn 
grants an even more limited scope of authority to the federal government), independent 
analysis of state declarations of rights is, and must be, the first order of constitutional 
inquiry.  See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); See also State v. Smith, 814 
P.2d 652, 662 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J. concurring) (stating “[s]tate constitutions were 
originally intended to be the primary devices to protect individual rights, with the federal 
constitution a secondary layer of protection.  Accordingly they were intended to provide 
broader protection [than their federal counterpart].”).  The purpose of the state 
constitution—including that portion of the constitution that articulates and affirms 
fundamental individual rights and imposes limitations on the government that is being 
created —is different from that of its federal counterpart.  There being no federal 
counterpart to Washington Constitution article. Const. art. I, sec. 10, Gunwall and its 
progeny make clear that an independent analysis of the state constitutional provision is 
indicated. 
60 As Justice Sutherland explained in the context of the right to counsel in criminal cases: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  If 
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
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whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect 
one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.  If that be 
true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and 
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.  If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or 
federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by 
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal 
would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the 
constitutional sense. 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
61 Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (referencing an individual’s right to appear by 
counsel in criminal cases). 
62 Although, such a right has long existed in English statutory law.  See 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 
(1495), reprinted in 2 STAT. OF THE REALM 578 (1969).  In recent years, the right has 
been effectuated through the English legal aid system.  See Perluss, supra note 13, at 586-
87. 
63 Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199. 
64 Carter I, 536 P.2d at 620. 
65 See WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.010 (2005). 
66 WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.080 (2005) reads: 
Hearing. (1) No attorney at law, legal paraprofessional, nor any person other 
than the plaintiff and defendant, shall appear or participate with the 
prosecution or defense of litigation in the small claims department without the 
consent of the judicial officer hearing the case. A corporation may not be 
represented by an attorney at law or legal paraprofessional except as set forth 
in WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.025.  
(2) In the small claims department it shall not be necessary to summon 
witnesses, but the plaintiff and defendant in any claim shall have the privilege 
of offering evidence in their behalf by witnesses appearing at trial. 
(3) The judge may informally consult witnesses or otherwise investigate the 
controversy between the parties and give judgment or make such orders as the 
judge may deem to be right, just, and equitable for the disposition of the 
controversy. 
67 The right attaches in favor of those who meet the standard of indigency applicable to 
proceeding in forma pauperis. 
68 If private counsel is available, no right to counsel at public expense would attach. 
69 See Major Prods. Co., 979 P.2d at 907-8 (appointing the University of Washington 
Legal Clinic to assist the unrepresented respondents). 
70 WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
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71 See generally WASH. ST. CT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (CJC), Cannon 3(A). 
72 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.006 (2005) (mandatory use of approved forms); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (2005) (procedure for establishing a parenting plan). 
73 Acting pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 26.12.240, most counties have hired full or 
part time courthouse-based family law facilitators who provide basic information and 
services to pro se family law litigants.  Activities of courthouse facilitators are governed 
by WASH. ST. CT. GENERAL R. 27, available at http://www.courts.was.gov/court_rules 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2005).  They may not provide individualized legal advice or 
assistance. 
74 Scores of self-help information packets are available on the statewide Washington 
Law Help website maintained by the Northwest Justice Project are available at 
www.washingtonlawhelp.org. 
75 The proliferation of self-help materials contributes to a false sense that low-income 
people can represent themselves competently in complex, contested family law matters.  
As one superior court judge recently explained: 
When designing a delivery system, we need to continue to remind ourselves, 
and the low- and moderate-income litigants, that they cannot represent 
themselves effectively. What with all the mandatory and other forms, 
facilitators and the like, the implicit message to folks is not only can they 
represent themselves but they can do it effectively. Allowing that implicit 
message to continue misrepresents how the system works to low- and 
moderate-income people. Self-representation may be the only option for low-
/moderate-income people, but we still owe them a duty to be honest about the 
process.   
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 8, at 82. 
76 Comprehensive substantive and procedural laws governing dissolution, parenting 
plans / child residential placement / basis for limitations, property disposition, child 
support, etc. are codified in Washington statute.  WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09. 
77 The state must appoint counsel for parents in state-initiated dependency proceedings.  
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090(2) (2005).  Civil proceedings under Title 26.09 do not 
currently require the appointment of counsel for unrepresented parents. 
78 Regarding a parent’s constitutionally protected substantive due process-based liberty 
interests regarding child rearing decisions, see In re the Parentage of: C.A.M.A, 109 P.3d 
405, 408 (Wash. 2005); In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998); Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). 
79 WASH. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(d)(1). 
80 NORTHWEST JUSTICE PROJECT, FOURTH QUARTER 2004 ADVOCACY REPORT 14 
(2004). Northwest Justice Project (NJP) is the principal statewide legal aid provider in 
Washington State.  Review of this report provides additional insight into a broad 
spectrum of civil cases where counsel must be required in order for individuals to secure 
meaningful access to the courts. 
81 Housing related legal problems represent one-sixth of all issues reported in the Civil 
Legal Needs Study.  See CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 8, at 34. 
82 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.050 (2005). 
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83 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.290 (2005). 
84 Munden v. Hazelrigg, 711 P.2d 295, 298 (Wash. 1985). 
85 The procedure is outlined in the state statute.  WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.010-030 
(2005); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.365-410 (2005). 
86 §§ 59.18.365-410. 
87 Id. 
88 E.g., Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 
(2005); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
89 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580 (2005) (prohibiting actions to terminate a tenancy 
on the basis of a tenant’s status as a victim of domestic violence), which statute 
ultimately served as the basis for the court’s dismissal of the landlord’s claim with 
prejudice. 
90 Factually, the rent had been paid.  Legally, provisions in the Residential Landlord 
Tenant Act protect residents from eviction due to the tenant’s status as a victim of 
domestic violence or sexual assault.  § 59.18.580. 
91 MAGNA CARTA art. 40. 
92 See, e.g., MD. CONST. 1776, art. XVII, XVIII (1776).  
XVII. That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to 
have remedy, by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right 
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the 
law of the land. 
XVIII. That the trial of facts where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, 
liberties and estates of the people. 
See also THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROVINCE OF EAST NEW JERSEY 
IN AMERICA (1689), art. XIX: 
That no person or persons within the said Province shall be taken and 
imprisoned, or be devised of his freehold, free custom or liberty, or be 
outlawed or exiled, or any other way destroyed; nor shall they be condemned 
or judgment pass’d upon them, but by lawful judgment of their peers: neither 
shall justice nor right be bought or sold, deferred or delayed, to any person 
whatsoever: … And in all courts persons of all persuasions may freely appear 
in their own way, and according to their own manner, and there personally 
plead their own causes themselves, or if unable, by their friends, no person 
being allowed to take money for pleading or advice in such cases . . .  
See also N.C. CONST. 1776, art. XIV (1776) (stating “[t]hat in all controversies at law, 
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the 
rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable”). 
93 This discussion incorporates the earlier discussion of what is meant by “meaningful 
access.” As employed in the analysis of Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. I, 
sec. 10, “meaningful access” is “the capacity to appear and effectively participate in 
proceedings properly presented to the court in a manner that will allow the court to 
operate properly carry out its adjudicative function to the end that justice can be done.” 
94 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
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95 Id. 
96 See State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996) (stating that “[t]his court has 
consistently construed the federal and state equal protection clauses identically and 
considered claims arising under their scope as one issue.”).  See also Grant County Fire 
Protection Dist. No. 5 v. Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 425 (Wash. 2004) [hereinafter Grant 
County II] (explaining that because of the unique development (or lack thereof) of federal 
case law since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the state privileges and 
immunities clause, art. 1, sec. 12, has been compared with the federal equal protection 
clause rather than its more logical counterpart, the federal privileges and immunities 
clause, U.S. CONST., art. IV, § sec. 2). 
97 The criticism and encouragement had come from members of the court itself (e.g., 
State v Smith, 814 P.2d at 662, and from commentators.  See, e.g., David Schuman, The 
Right to “Equal Privileges and Immunities”: A State’s Version of “Equal Protection,” 13 
VT. L. REV. 221, 221 (1988); Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution’s 
Prohibition on Special Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for “Equal Protection” 
Review of Regulatory Legislation?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1996); Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L .J. 1013, 
1043 (2003); Barbara Mahoney, The Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 
the Washington State Constitution (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author 
and referenced in Justice Sanders’ dissent in Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. 
Moses Lake, 42 P.3d 394, 416 (Wash. 2002)) [hereinafter Grant County I]. 
98 Rosenow observes that art. I, sec. 12 was borrowed from the Oregon, Hill draft 
(borrowed from California) and Indiana constitutions.  JOURNAL OF CONVENTION, supra 
note 43, at 501 n. 1.   In recent years both the Oregon and Indiana Supreme Courts have 
deviated from the traditional conclusion that the rights protected by these state privileges 
and immunities clauses were coextensive with those protected under federal equal 
protection analysis, and have developed an independent state constitutional framework 
for considering claims that legislative classifications confer special privileges or 
immunities in violation of these provisions.  See, e.g., State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814-
815 (Or. 1981) (noting that the state privileges and immunities clause “forbids inequality 
of privileges or immunities not available ‘upon the same terms,’ first, to any citizen, and 
second, to any class of citizens.”); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind. 1994) 
(reasoning that the Indiana privileges and immunities clause intended to preclude the 
legislature from conferring affirmative and special privileges to some citizens, but was 
not intended to be an assurance of equal protections of the laws).  Unfortunately, the 
jurisprudence that has developed in each of these states turns out to be more in the nature 
of a highly deferential equal-protection analysis than an independent assessment of the 
constitutionality of state conduct that interferes with “fundamental rights that are 
incidents of state citizenship.”  See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Crocker, 22 P.3d 759, 766 
(Or. 2001); Humphreys v. Clinic for Women,,796 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. 2003); Morrison 
v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  See also, Jon Laramore, Indiana 
Constitutional Developments: The Wind Shifts, 36 IND. L. REV. 961, 964  n.29 (2003). 
99 Grant County II, 83 P.3d 419. 
100 Id.  The scope of individual protections and the corresponding limitations on 
governmental conduct established by the privileges and immunities clause are likely to be 
Meaningful Access to the Courts 437 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
 
addressed in greater detail when the Washington Supreme Court issues its opinion in 
Andersen v. King County, No. 3-75934-1 (argued Mar. 8, 2005). 
101 The special privileges and immunities inquiry is independent of the equal protection 
inquiry conducted under the same section, jurisprudential authority for which did not 
appear to be affected by the Grant County II decision. 
102 Grant County II, 83 P.3d at 428. 
103 State v. Vance, 70 P. 34, 41 (Wash. 1902). 
104 Id. (citing THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
597 (1868)). 
105 Id.; See also The Slaughter-House Cases , 83 U.S. 36, 37 (1872) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting), citing the famous observation of Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. 
Coryell, to the effect that that the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several 
states (as opposed to citizens of the United States) at the time of the ratification of the 
federal constitution included, among the many rights that would be “more tedious than 
difficult to enumerate,” is the right “to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the 
courts of the state.”). 
106 See Grant County II, 83 P.3d at 426 (citing Thompson, supra  note 97, at 1253).  See 
also Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 515 (Or. 1989) (noting that “[t]he original 
target of this constitutional prohibition was the abuse of governmental authority to 
provide special privileges or immunities for favored individuals or classes, not 
discrimination against disfavored ones.”). 
107 Grant County II involved a statutory scheme granting annexation petition rights to 
some but not others. 
108 Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. IV, section, § 1 is a grant of authority to 
the judiciary to establish and maintain a system for the fair, proper, and equitable 
administration of justice. 
109 In this case, the class includes those who need the assistance of legal counsel to 
meaningfully participate in court proceedings, but who cannot afford to do so and, as a 
consequence, are effectively denied the ability to assert, enforce, or defend their legal 
rights in said court proceedings. 
110 For example, the fundamental right of meaningful access. 
111 Those who have the ability to retain legal counsel and meaningfully participate in the 
judicial forum. 
112 Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199. 
113 WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
114 MAGNA CARTA, art. 40. 
115 The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamiliton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, THE JUDICIARY 
(McLean’s ed., May 28, 1788). 
116 Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228 (emphasis supplied). 
117 Compare this language with Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. 1, sec. § 10, 
which states that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without 
unnecessary delay.” 
438 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
118 Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 305 (1979), available at, 
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1979/3.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at ¶ 24. 
121 Id. at ¶ 26. 
122 Id. at ¶ 26, 28. 
123 Steel & Morris v. U.K., 41X Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 22, (2005), available at, 
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/103.html. 
124 Id. at ¶ 12. 
125 Under England’s Legal Aid Act of 1988, libel actions were categorically excluded 
from those cases for which legal counsel would be provided.  Id. at para. 41. 
126 Id. at ¶ 35. 
127 Id. at ¶ 72. 
128 Id. at ¶ 59. 
129 Id. at ¶ 60-61. 
130 Id. at ¶ 62. 
131 Id. at ¶ 63. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at  ¶ 64, 66. 
135 Id. at ¶ 67. 
136 See id. at ¶ 72. 
137 Id. 
